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Abstract
Stochastic dominance is a crucial decision-theoretic tool for the analysis of choice
under risk. While most gambles are not ordered with respect to stochastic dominance,
those that are ranked admit an extremely robust prediction: the dominant one is
preferred by any expected utility maximizing agent, as well as according to many
behavioral theories.
Stochastic dominance is typically studied as a property of two gambles that are
taken in isolation. In this paper, we study how additional independent sources of risk
(e.g. uninsurable labor risk, house price risk, etc.) can affect the ordering of gambles.
We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render
lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of first-order stochastic
dominance. We extend our results to second order stochastic dominance, and show
how they lead to a novel, and elementary, axiomatization of mean-variance preferences.
1 Introduction
A choice between risky prospects is often difficult to make. It is perhaps even harder
to predict, since decision makers vary in their preferences. One exception is when the
prospects are ordered in terms of stochastic dominance. In this case, a standard prediction
is that the dominant option is chosen. For this reason, stochastic dominance has long been
seen as a central concept in decision theory and the economics of information, and remains
an area of active research (see, e.g. Müller et al., 2016; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2016, among
others). More generally, stochastic dominance is an important tool for non-parametric
comparison of distributions.
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In the typical analysis of choices under risk, stochastic dominance is studied as a
property of two prospects X and Y that are taken in isolation, without considering other
risks the decision maker might be facing. However, a choice between two gambles or assets
often happens in the presence of unavoidable background risks, such as risks related to
health, human capital, or exposure to the aggregate uncertainty in the economy.
In this paper we study how stochastic dominance is affected by background noise.
Given two random variables X and Y , we are interested in understanding if an independent
risk Z can make the resulting variables X + Z and Y + Z ordered in terms of stochastic
dominance, and, if so, under what conditions. Our main result is that such a Z exists
whenever X has higher mean than Y . We further show that if X and Y have equal mean,
but the first has lower variance, then Z can be chosen so that X + Z dominates Y + Z
in terms of second-order stochastic dominance. The conditions of having higher mean or
lower variance are necessary for the results to hold, and no other assumptions are imposed
on X and Y .
We show that the distribution of Z can be obtained as a convex combination (1 −
ε)G+ εH, where G is the distribution of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and
(possibly large) variance, and H is the distribution of an additional noise term with heavy
tails. The weight ε can be taken to be arbitrarily small. Hence, up to a vanishing degree
of error, the background risk is indistinguishable from Gaussian/Normal noise. The role
played by H is to produce a distribution displaying sufficiently thick tails, a feature that,
as we show, is necessary for the background noise to lead to stochastic dominance.
Interestingly, Acemoglu et al. (2017) provide evidence of key macroeconomic variables—
presumably related to individual risk—that take a form similar to the one described above:
their distributions are approximately Gaussian around their mean but display heavier tails.
Our results, therefore, draw a connection between the analysis of choice under risk and the
study of distributions with thick tail, a subject of long and renewed interest across different
fields of economics, including macroeconomics (Gabaix et al., 2006; Morris and Yildiz,
2016), finance (Gabaix et al., 2003; Kelly and Jiang, 2014), as well as other disciplines
(Nair et al., 2013).
As is well-known, ranking risky prospects solely in terms of their mean and variance is
a crude approach for decision-making under risk, especially if compared to expected utility
theory. Nevertheless, mean and variance remain key statistics driving the decisions of
practitioners and investors. Our results show that such a seemingly ad-hoc approach can be
justified in the presence of suitable background risk: while first and second order stochastic
dominance are much stronger orders than the comparisons of means and variances, our
results suggest that the latter are, under background risk, surprisingly good proxies for the
former.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to study the effect of indepen-
dent noise on stochastic dominance. We view the main contribution of our research as
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characterizing, in a fairly general framework, the possible boundaries of this effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the main results. Sec-
tion 4 relates our findings to the literature on choice over lotteries in the presence of
background risk (Gollier and Pratt, 1996). Section 4 applies our results to provide a
simple axiomatization of mean-variance preferences, distinct from the previous approaches
(Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006). In Section 5 we apply our results to the
study of mechanism design with risk averse agents.
2 Definitions and Main Results
Recall that a random variable X first-order stochastically dominates Y , denoted X ≥1 Y , if
it satisfies E[φ(X)] ≥ E[φ(Y )] for every increasing function φ for which the two expectations
are well defined. We write X >1 Y if X and Y have distinct distributions (equivalently,
if X ≥1 Y but Y 6≥1 X).1 A random variable X second-order stochastically dominates
Y , denoted X ≥2 Y , if E[φ(X)] ≥ E[φ(Y )] for every concave increasing function φ for
which the two expectations are well defined. As before, we write X >2 Y if X and Y have
distinct distributions.
The following standard result will be useful. Given any two random variables X and Y ,
if X ≥1 Y then X +Z ≥1 Y +Z for any Z that is independent from the two.2 Hence, two
variables that are ranked in terms of stochastic dominance remain so after the addition
of independent noise. The corresponding conclusion holds for second-order stochastic
dominance.
We denote by P∞ the set of random variables, or gambles, X that have all finite
moments. That is, a gamble X belongs to P∞ if E[|X|n] is finite for all n ∈ N. We can
now state our first main result:
Theorem 1. Let X and Y be random variables with finite expectation. If E[X] > E[Y ]
then there exists a random variable Z that is independent from X and Y and such that
X + Z >1 Y + Z. (1)
Moreover, if X,Y ∈ P∞ then Z can be taken to belong to P∞.
By taking φ to be linear, the converse to the result is also true: if there exists a variable
Z for which (1) holds, then two distributions must satisfy E[X] > E[Y ]. When Z has finite
expectation, this follows from the fact that any two variables that are ranked by >1 are
also ranked by their expectation.
1Yet again equivalently, X >1 Y if E[φ(X)] > E[φ(Y )] for all strictly increasing functions φ for which
the two expectations are well defined.
2If X ≥1 Y then for every increasing φ and z ∈ R, E[φ(X+z)] ≥ E[φ(Y +z)] by applying the definition of
FOSD to the function x 7→ φ(x+ z). Hence, E[φ(X +Z)] = ∫ E[φ(X + z)]dFZ(z) ≥ ∫ E[φ(Y + z)]dFZ(z) =
E[φ(Y + Z)] and thus X + Z ≥1 Y + Z.
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It is important to point out that the conclusion of Theorem 1 is true not with respect
to just a single random variable Z but for a general class of distributions. The relation
X +W >1 Y +W holds for any W = Z + Z1 + . . .+ Zn that is obtained from Z by the
addition of extra terms (Zi) that are independent from X,Y and Z.
Our second main result parallels Theorem 1 and establishes an analogous conclusion
for second-order stochastic dominance:
Theorem 2. Let X and Y be random variables with finite variance. If E[X] = E[Y ] and
Var[X] < Var[Y ] then there exists a random variable Z that is independent from X and Y
and such that
X + Z >2 Y + Z.
Moreover, if X,Y ∈ P∞ then Z can be taken to belong to P∞.
2.1 Proof Sketch and Discussion
Underlying Theorem 1 is the following intuition. As is well known, first-order stochastic
dominance between X +Z and Y +Z is equivalent to the requirement that the cumulative
distribution function (or cdf ) FY+Z of the gamble Y + Z is greater, pointwise, than the
cdf FX+Z of X + Z.
The assumption that X has higher expectation than Y implies, using integration by
parts, that the cdfs of the two random variables must satisfy
E[X]− E[Y ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(FY (t)− FX(t))dt > 0. (2)
So, on average, the cumulative distribution function FY must lie above FX . Now consider
adding an independent random variable Z, distributed according to a probability density
fZ . Then, given a point s ∈ R, the difference between the resulting cdfs can be expressed
as
FY+Z(s)− FX+Z(s) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(FY (t)− FX(t))fZ(s− t)dt (3)
If fZ is sufficiently diffuse (for instance, by taking Z to be uniformly distributed around
s over a sufficiently large support) then it follows from the strict inequality (2) that the
difference (3) is positive in a neighborhood of s.
So, the crucial difficulty in establishing Theorem 1 is to show the existence of a
well-defined distribution such that the difference FY+Z − FX+Z is positive everywhere.
The existence of such a distribution FZ is not trivial. The proof of Theorem 1 provides
an explicit construction, building on mathematical techniques introduced, in a different
context, by Ruzsa and Székely (1988).
While the details of the construction are somewhat technical, the background risk in
Theorem 1 can be approximated (in terms of total variation distance) by Gaussian noise,
up to a vanishing degree of error:
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Remark 1. Let X and Y be as in Theorem 1. For every ε ∈ (0, 1) there exists a random
variable Z that satisfies (1) and is distributed according to
FZ = (1− ε)G+ εH
where G is the cdf of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero, and H is the cdf of a
random variable.
In the proof of Theorem 1, the background risk Z is defined as follows. We construct
a sequence U1, U2, . . . of i.i.d. random variables and an independent geometric random
variable N such that P[N = n] = (1 − ε)εn for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Letting W be an
independent Gaussian random variable, we define
Z = W + (U1 + U2 + · · ·+ UN ). (4)
So, the random variable Z is obtained as a sum of mean-zero Gaussian noise and
geometric sum of independent noise terms. With probability 1− ε the variable N takes
value 0 and therefore Z reduces to standard Gaussian noise. With probability (1− ε)εn, n
additional terms U1 + . . .+ Un contribute to the background risk.
2.2 Orders of Magnitude
An immediate question, at this point, is to understand the orders of magnitude involved.
In particular, how large does the background risk need to be? We consider, as a rep-
resentative example, a decision maker who is confronted with a small gamble X with
positive expectation, and the choice of whether to take X or to receive 0 for sure. We
show that a background risk Z that is not implausibly large in many contexts (e.g. risk
of unemployment or risk stemming from variation in house prices) suffices to make X
dominant.
In particular, suppose X pays $12 and −$10 with equal probabilities. Then, there
exists a background risk Z, of the form described in (4), that satisfies Z +X >1 Z, and
has the following properties: its distribution is a mixture that gives weight 1− ε = 0.99 to
a Gaussian with standard deviation $3,500. The standard deviation of Z itself is $3,525. If
X pays $100 and -$50 with equal probability, then we can set ε = 0.022 and the standard
deviation of Z is $4,551.3
3 Uniformity
In this section we address the following two questions. First, is the noise term obtained in
Theorem 1 robust to changes in the distribution of X and Y ? Moreover, can it be given a
3Further examples can be found in table 1 in the Appendix. Because the proof is Theorem 1 is
constructive, these quantities can be easily computed numerically.
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closed-form description? By restricting the attention to random variables with bounded
support, we provide positive answers to both questions.
We consider pairs of random variables X and Y such that:
(a) Their support is included in a bounded interval [−M,M ]; and
(b) Their difference in mean is bounded below by E[X]− E[Y ] ≥ εM , where ε > 0.
Given M and ε, we construct a variable Z that satisfies X + Z >1 Y + Z for any pair
X and Y for which (a) and (b) hold. In addition, we show that Z can be taken to be a
combination of uniformly distributed random variables.
The random variable Z is defined by three parameters: M and ε, as described above, as
well as a parameter a > 0, which for the next result we are going to take to be sufficiently
large. Let U1, U2, . . . be i.i.d. random variables that are uniformly distributed on the union
of intervals [−a−M,−a+M ]∪ [a−M,a+M ]. Let N be an independent geometric random
variable with parameter 1/2, so that P[N = n] = 2−1−n for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Finally, let
R1 and R2 be variables independent from N and U1, U2, . . . and uniformly distributed on
[−a, a]. We define
Z = R1 +R2 + (U1 + U2 + · · ·UN ). (5)
So, the random variable Z is obtained as a sum of mean-zero, independent noise terms
that are uniformly distributed.
Theorem 3. Fix M, ε > 0 and a ≥ 16Mε−1 + 8M . The random variable Z, as defined in
(5), is such that for every X,Y supported in [−M,M ] with E[X]−E[Y ] ≥ εM it holds that
X + Z >1 Y + Z.
Notice that for smaller ε, as the difference in expectation between X and Y becomes
negligible, the support of each term Ui becomes increasingly large. The random variable Z
is reasonably “well-behaved”: for example, it has all moments, and exponentially vanishing
tails. Using Wald’s Lemma, its variance can be shown to be
Var[Z] = 23(M/ε)
2
(
1024 + 1024ε+ 257ε2
)
,
so that its standard deviation is of order Mε−1, and never more than 30Mε−1.
To put this into perspective, consider an agent who must make a choice between two
lotteries that pay between -$10 and $10, and whose expected value differs by at least $1.
Theorem 3 implies that there exists a zero mean independent background noise which—for
any utility function—makes the lottery with the higher expectation preferable. Moreover,
this noise need not be incredibly large: a standard deviation of $3000 suffices.
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4 Choices and Background Risk
The next result, an immediate corollary of Theorem 1, shows that large background
risk can lead to risk neutral behavior: Given a finite set of gambles, there is a source
of background risk such that any agent whose preferences are monotone with respect
to first-order stochastic dominance will rank as more preferable gambles with higher
expectation.
Corollary 1. Let {X1, . . . , Xk} be a finite collection of gambles in P∞ such that E[Xi] >
E[Xj ] if i > j. Then there is an independent Z ∈ P∞ such that
Xi + Z >1 Xj + Z for all i > j.
Proof. For each i there is an independent Zi ∈ P∞ such that Xi+1 + Zi >1 Xi + Zi. Let
Z = Z1 + . . .+ Zk. Then Xi+1 + Zi >1 Xi + Zi implies Xi+1 + Z >1 Xi + Z. Because >1
is transitive, Xi + Z >1 Xj + Z whenever i > j.
Corollary 1 is reminiscent of the classical Arrow-Pratt approximation. As is well known,
any expected utility maximizer, when choosing out of a finite menu of monetary gambles
that are sufficiently small, will behave approximately as a risk neutral agent, and select
as optimal the gamble with the highest expected value.4 Corollary 1 establishes a similar
conclusion for the case where the gambles under consideration are coupled with a suitable
background risk Z. It implies that a decision maker who has preferences that are consistent
with first-order stochastic dominance—a class much larger than expected utility5—will
behave like a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer when facing some (potentially large)
background risks.
5 Mean-Variance Preferences
In this section we apply Theorem 2 to provide a simple axiomatization of the classic
mean-variance preferences of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958).6
We consider a decision maker whose preferences over monetary lotteries are described
by a certainty equivalent functional C : P∞ → R that associates to each lottery X the sure
amount of money C(X) that makes her indifferent between X and C(X).
4More precisely, consider a set of gambles {kX1, . . . , kXn} where k ≥ 0 measures the size of the risk.
Under expected utility and a differentiable utility function, the certainty equivalent of each kXi is given by
kE[Xi] plus a term vanishing at rate k2.
5Commonly used examples in this large class are cumulative prospect theory preferences (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992), rank dependent utility (Quiggin, 1991) and cautious expected utility (Cerreia-Vioglio
et al., 2015).
6A previous axiomatization appears in Epstein (1985), for DARA preferences. Related results are due
to Maccheroni et al. (2006, 2009).
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With slight abuse of notation, we denote by x the constant random variable that takes
value x ∈ R. For the next result, a gamble X is said to be a mean preserving spread of Y
if the two have the same expectation and Y second-order stochastically dominates X.7
Proposition 1. A functional C : P∞ → R satisfies:
1. (Certainty) C(x) = x for all x ∈ R;
2. (Monotonicity) If X is a mean preserving spread of Y then C(X) ≤ C(Y ); and
3. (Additivity) If X,Y are independent then C(X + Y ) = C(X) + C(Y );
if and only if there exists k ≥ 0 such that
C(X) = E[X]− kVar[X].
Proposition 1 characterizes mean-variance preferences by three simple properties.
The Certainty axiom is necessary for C(X) to be interpreted as a certainty equivalent.
Monotonicity requires C to rank as more desirable gambles that are less dispersed around
their mean. The Additivity axiom says that the certainty equivalent is additive for
independent gambles.
A key step in the proof of Proposition 1 is to show that when restricted to mean 0
random variables, a functional C that satisfies properties (1)-(3) is a decreasing function
of the variance. This is an immediate implication of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. It is immediate to verify that properties (1)-(3) are satisfied by
the representation. We now prove the converse implication.
Suppose E[X] = E[Y ] and Var[X] < Var[Y ]. Then, by Theorem 2, there exists an
independent random variable Z such that X+Z >2 Y +Z. By monotonicity and additivity,
this implies C(X)+C(Z) = C(X+Z) ≥ C(Y +Z) = C(Y )+C(Z). Hence, C(X) ≥ C(Y ).
Suppose E[X] = E[Y ] and Var[X] = Var[Y ] = σ2. We show that C(X) = C(Y ).
Assume, as a way of contradiction, that C(X) − C(Y ) = ε > 0. Let (X1, X2, . . .) and
(Y1, Y2, . . .) be i.i.d. sequences where each Xi is distributed as X, and each Yi is distributed
as Y . Fix a random variable Z independent from the two sequences, and such that
E[Z] = 0 and Var[Z] > 0. Because Xi ≥2 X and X ≥2 Xi, then C(Xi) = C(X). Similarly,
C(Yi) = C(Y ). By additivity,
C(X1 + · · ·+Xn + Z)− C(Y1 + · · ·+ Yn) = nε+ C(Z),
which is strictly positive for n large enough. However, nσ2 + Var[Z] = Var[X1 + · · · +
Xn + Z] > Var[Y1 + · · ·+ Yn] = nσ2, and so, by the first part of the proof, we have that
7Equivalently, X is smaller than Y in the convex order.
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C(X1 + . . . + Xn + Z) − C(Y1 + . . . + Yn) ≤ 0 and we reached a contradiction. Hence
C(X) = C(Y ).
Thus, restricted to zero mean X ∈ P∞, C satisfies C(X) = f(Var[X]) for some
function f . In addition, by the first part of the proof, f is nonincreasing. Furthermore,
f is additive (i.e., f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y)) since C is additive. As is well known, every
nonincreasing additive f : R+ → R is linear. To see this, note that if m,n ∈ N, then,
letting q = m/n, we have mf(1) = f(m) = f(nq) = nf(q). Thus, f(q) = qf(1) for every
rational q. Hence, for every x ∈ R+ and positive rational q, q′ such that q ≤ x ≤ q′
we have q′f(1) = f(q′) ≤ f(x) ≤ f(q) = qf(1). So, f(x) = xf(1) for every x. To
conclude the proof, notice that for any X (with possibly non-zero mean) additivity and
certainty imply C(X − E[X]) = C(X) − E[X]. Therefore, letting k = −f(1), we obtain
C(X) = E[X]− kVar[X].
We end this section with an additional result characterizing the expectation as the
unique functional on P∞ that is monotone with respect to first order stochastic dominance,
and additive for independent random variable.
Proposition 2. A functional C : P∞ → R satisfies:
1. (Certainty) C(1) = 1;
2. (Monotonicity) If X >1 Y then C(X) ≥ C(Y ); and
3. (Additivity) If X,Y are independent then C(X + Y ) = C(X) + C(Y );
if and only if C(X) = E[X].
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof closely follows that of Proposition 1. As in that proof,
it is immediate to verify that properties (1)-(2) are satisfied by the representation.
Denote (as above) by x the random variable that take the value x ∈ R with probability
1, and define f : R→ R by f(x) = C(x). By additivity and monotonicity f is monotone
increasing and additive and so, as in the proof of Proposition 1, f(x) = kx for some k ≥ 0.
Certainty implies k = 1.
We show that if E[X] > E[Y ] then C(X) ≥ C(Y ). Indeed, in this case, by Theorem 1
there is an independent Z ∈ P∞ such that X + Z >1 Y + Z, and so by monotonicity
C(X + Z) ≥ C(Y + Z). By additivity it follows that C(X) ≥ C(Y ). Hence for any ε > 0
it holds that
C(X) ≤ C(E[X] + ε) = f(E[X] + ε)
and
C(X) ≥ C(E[X]− ε) = f(E[X]− ε).
Thus C(X) = f(E[X]) = E[X].
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6 Implementation with Risk Aversion
In this section we show how Theorem 1 can be used to construct mechanisms that are
robust to uncertainty about the agents’ risk attitudes.
Consider a mechanism design problem with n agents, where each agent’s type is θi ∈ Θi,
and θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) is drawn from some joint distribution. We assume that the set of types
Θ = ∏i Θi is finite. The designer chooses an allocation x ∈ X and a transfer ti ∈ R for each
agent i. By the revelation principle we can without loss of generality restrict to mechanisms
where each agent reports their type and it is optimal for the agents to be truthful. A direct
mechanism (x, t) is a tuple consisting of an allocation function x : ∏ni=1 Θi → X and a
transfer function t : ∏ni=1 Θi → ∆(Rn). We restrict attention to mechanisms where each
random transfer ti(θ) has all moments. Most of the literature on mechanism design focuses
on the quasi-linear case, where agent i’s utility is given by
vi(x, θ)− ti .
Here, vi(x, θ) denotes the monetary equivalent of the utility agent i derives from the
physical allocation x when the type profile equals θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). Note, that as v depends
on the complete type profile we allow for interdependent values.
A restriction which is imposed when assuming quasi-linear preferences is that the agents
are risk neutral over money. To more generally model agents who might not be risk neutral,
we assume that preferences are of the form
ui (vi(x, θ)− ti) , (6)
where ui : R→ R is agent i’s utility function over money. We assume ui is bounded by a
polynomial; see Section 7 for a discussion of this integrability assumption. Preferences (6)
are commonly considered in the literature on auctions with risk aversion (see for example
case 1. in Maskin and Riley, 1984) or in the literature on optimal income taxation (see for
example Diamond, 1998).
A mechanism (x, t) is Bayes incentive compatible if for every type θi and every agent i
it is optimal to report her type truthfully to the mechanism, given that all other players
do the same
θi ∈ argmax
θˆi
E
[
ui
(
vi(x(θˆi, θ−i), θ)− ti(θˆi, θ−i)
)
| θi
]
(u-BIC)
A mechanism is Bayes incentive compatible (BIC) under quasi-linear preferences if it
satisfies (u-BIC) when all agents’ utilities over money are linear, i.e. ui(x) = x. A
mechanism is strictly Bayes incentive compatible if the maximum in (u-BIC) is unique.
Bayes incentive compatibility depends on the utility functions u = (u1, . . . , un) and
thus the risk attitudes of the agents. We are interested in finding mechanisms which
implement a given physical allocation x for any vector of utilities. To explicitly model this
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problem we consider the stronger notion of ordinal incentive compatibility (d’Aspremont
and Peleg, 1988).
Definition 1. A direct mechanism (x, t) is ordinal incentive compatible if (u-BIC) is
satisfied for all non-decreasing utility functions u1, . . . , un.
It is natural to ask which physical allocation rules x can be implemented ordinally.8
Our main result in this section is that (essentially) any allocation that can be implemented
when the agents have quasi-linear utilities can also be implemented when the agents
have arbitrary utilities u that are unknown to the designer. Thus, perhaps surprisingly,
knowledge of the agents risk attitudes is not necessary to implement a given allocation. To
make a Bayes IC mechanism ordinally IC it suffices to add a carefully chosen risk to the
transfer that is independent of the agents’ reports.
Proposition 3. Suppose the direct mechanism (x, t) is strictly Bayes incentive compatible
with quasi-linear preferences. Then, there exists another ordinally incentive compatible
direct mechanism (x, τ) that implements the same physical allocation x and raises the same
expected revenue from each agent given each vector of reported types θˆ, i.e., E[τi(θˆ)] =
E[ti(θˆ)] for every i.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3 is a direct application of Corollary 1. Fix agent i’s type
to be θi. For each θˆi ∈ Θi denote by µθˆi the distribution of vi(x(θˆi, θ−i), θ) − ti(θˆi, θ−i)
(i.e., the monetary utility of i when reporting θˆi) conditioned on the true type θi. Let Xθˆi
be distributed according to µθˆi . Strict Bayes incentive compatibility says that
E[Xθi ] > E[Xθˆi ]
whenever θˆi 6= θi. By Corollary 1 there thus exists an independent random variable Zθi
such that Xθi + Zθi >1 Xθˆi + Zθi . Furthermore, since the random variables (Xθˆi) have
all moments, we can assume that Zθ′i does too, and has zero mean. By repeating this
construction for each player i and each true type θi, we obtain a collection (Zθi) of random
variables which we can assume to be independent. Let Zi =
∑
θi∈Θi Zθi . Then it still
holds that Xθi + Zi >1 Xθˆi + Zi for every every θi, and so the mechanism (x, τ) with
τi(θˆ) = ti(θˆ) + Zi is ordinal incentive compatible. In addition, E[τi(θˆ)] = E[ti(θˆ)] since Zi
has zero mean.
The result has the following additional implication. As (x, t) and (x, τ) implement
the same physical allocation x, it follows that the set of strictly implementable physical
8A first observation is that every mechanism which is ex-post or dominant strategy IC is also ordinally
IC.
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allocations is the same under Bayes IC and ordinal IC. This is in contrast to dominant
strategy IC for which the set of implementable physical allocations is strictly smaller.9
In our analysis we have abstracted away from individual rationality. A mechanism
that is individually rational when agents are risk neutral is not necessarily individually
rational when ui is concave. The addition of background noise may violate individual
rationality for risk averse agents, and thus require the agents to be compensated to ensure
their participation. This, however, would not change the set of implementable physical
allocation rules.
7 Discussion
Unbounded Support and Tail Risk. We first observe that the noise term Z in
Theorem 1 cannot have bounded support, unless additional assumptions are imposed on
X and Y . This holds even if we only consider bounded X and Y . Indeed, in order for
X + Z >1 Y + Z to be satisfied, the maximum of the support of X + Z must lie weakly
above that of Y + Z. In particular, if Z has bounded bounded and X + Z >1 Y + Z, then
the maximum of the support of X must be greater than the maximum of the support Y .
In addition, the background risk Z must generally display non-negligible risk at the
tails. For instance, it is impossible for a Gaussian Z to satisfy Theorem 3; this holds even
if we restrict the random variables in question to be finitely supported. Indeed, any Z that
satisfies Theorem 3 must have thick tails in the sense that E[exp(tZ)] =∞ for some t ∈ R
large enough.
To see the necessity for thick tailed distributions, note that if the maximum of the
support of X is strictly less than that of Y (which of course does not preclude that
E[X] > E[Y ]) then E[exp(tX)] < E[exp(tY )] for t large enough. Hence for any independent
Z for which E[exp(tZ)] is finite it holds that
E
[
et(X+Z)
]
= E
[
etX
]
· E
[
etZ
]
< E
[
etY
]
· E
[
etZ
]
= E
[
et(Y+Z)
]
,
and so it cannot be that X + Z >1 Y + Z.
Integrability As is well known, distributions with unbounded support require the
specification of a class of utility functions for which all expectations are finite, so that
issues similar to the St. Petersburg paradox do not arise.
A standard solution is to restrict attention to utility functions that are bounded. See,
e.g., Aumann (1977). More generally, following Russell and Seo (1978) (see also Ryan,
1974; Arrow, 1974), one may wish to consider utility functions that have polynomial tails.
9Note, that as Gershkov et al. (2013) show, the set of implementable interim utilities under some
conditions is the same under dominant strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility even if the set of
implementable allocation rules differs.
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This assumption is more general and allows for utility functions that are strictly increasing
and strictly concave everywhere.10 For any such u and gamble X ∈ P∞ with all finite
moments, the resulting expected utility E[u(X)] is well-defined and finite.
By definition, distributions with thick tails rule out CARA as a class of utility functions
for which integrability is preserved. This, however, does not make thick tailed distributions
pathological. Many standard distributions have thick tails: examples include geometric,
exponential and gamma distributions. All of these have finite moments and exponentially
vanishing tails. Distribution with thick tails have been used to describe many economic
variables of interest (Acemoglu et al., 2017), and are the subject of a growing literature in
the economics (see, e.g., Morris and Yildiz, 2016).
Conclusion Our main theorem establishes a connection between two orderings—having
strictly greater mean and first-order stochastic dominance—that differ substantially in
their strength and implications. An interesting avenue for future research is to study more
quantitative versions of our result and to what extent the stark predictions implied by our
results are reflected in actual behavior.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Denote by Pn the collection of all Borel probability measures on R that have finite nth
moment:
Pn =
{
ν :
∫
R
|x|n dν(x) <∞
}
.
We denote P∞ = ⋂n Pn. Likewise, denote by Mn the collection of all bounded Borel
signed measures on R that have finite nth moment. That is, µ ∈Mn if
∫
R |x|n dµ(x) <∞.
Recall that a signed measure µ is bounded if its absolute value |µ| is a finite measure. As
usual, given µ, ν ∈ Mn we write µ ≥ ν if µ(A) ≥ ν(A) for every Borel A ⊆ R. We equip
Mn with the total-variation norm
‖µ‖ =
∫
R
1 d|µ|.
We denote the convolution of µ1, µ2 ∈Mn (and in its subset Pn) by µ1 ∗ µ2, and by µ(k)
the k-fold convolution of µ with itself for all k ≥ 1. To simplify notation we define µ(0)
to be δ, the Dirac measure at zero, so that µ(k) ∗ µ(m) = µ(k+m) for all k,m ≥ 0. Note
thatMn, equipped with the norm defined above, is a Banach space which is closed under
convolutions. In fact, (Mn, ∗,+) is a Banach algebra, so that µ ∗ (ν1 + ν2) = µ ∗ ν1 +µ ∗ ν2.
The following lemma is due to Ruzsa and Székely (1988, pp. 126–127). It states that
a signed measure that assigns total mass 1 to R can be “smoothed” into a probability
measure by convolving it with an appropriately chosen probability measure. We provide
the proof for the reader’s convenience; an essentially identical proof also appears in Mattner
(1999, p. 616), as well as in Mattner (2004, p. 159).
Lemma 1 (Ruzsa and Székely, Mattner). Let n ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}. For every µ ∈Mn with
µ(R) = 1 there is a ν ∈ Pn such that µ ∗ ν ∈ Pn.
Proof. Let ρa be the measure of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and standard
deviation a > 0.11. For some 0 < c < 1 and some pi ∈ Pn let
τ = (1− c)
∞∑
k=0
ckpi(k),
where pi(0) is δ, the Dirac measure at zero. Since c < 1 the series converges and so τ is a
probability measure. Let
ν = ρ(2)a ∗ τ.
We show that µ ∗ ν ∈ Pn for an appropriate choice of a, c and pi. To see that µ ∗ ν is a
probability measure note first that [µ ∗ ν](R) = 1,12 and so it suffices to show that µ ∗ ν is
11One could take here any other distribution (e.g., the uniform probability distribution on [−a, a]) such
that ρ(2)a ≥ βρa for some β > 0.
12This follows immediately from the fact that
∫∞
−∞ d(µ ∗ ν)(x) =
∫∞
−∞ dµ(x)×
∫∞
−∞ dν(x) .
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positive. To see this, we write
µ ∗ ν = ρ(2)a ∗ µ ∗ τ
= ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ + δ − cpi + cpi) ∗ τ
= ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ + cpi) ∗ τ + ρ(2)a ∗ (δ − cpi) ∗ τ.
Now, by the definition of τ ,
cpi ∗ τ = (1− c)
∞∑
k=0
ck+1pi(k+1) = τ − (1− c)δ.
Hence (δ − cpi) ∗ τ = (1− c)δ, and so
µ ∗ ν = ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ + cpi) ∗ τ + (1− c)ρ(2)a .
It follows by comparing the densities of ρ(2)a and ρa that ρ(2)a ≥ 1√2ρa. Hence
ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ + cpi) ≥ ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ) +
c√
2
ρa ∗ pi (7)
= c√
2
ρa ∗
[√
2
c
ρa ∗ (µ− δ) + pi
]
. (8)
Thus, if we choose a, c and pi so that
√
2
c ρa ∗ (µ− δ) + pi is a positive measure it will follow
that µ ∗ ν is also positive. To this end we set
c√
2
= ‖ρa ∗ (µ− δ)‖.
and
pi =
√
2
c
|ρa ∗ (µ− δ)| = 1‖ρa ∗ (µ− δ)‖|ρa ∗ (µ− δ)|,
and if 0 < c < 1. If c = 0 for some a then ρa ∗ µ = ρa and we can take ν = ρa to conclude
the proof of the theorem. In addition, c =
√
2‖(µ − δ) ∗ ρa‖ tends to 0 as a tends to
infinity,13 so we can choose a large enough so that c < 1, and in fact c as small as we like.
13Let δy be the point mass at y. Then δy ∗ ρa is a Gaussian distribution with mean y and standard
deviation a. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two is well-known to be D(δy ∗ ρa‖ρa) = 12
(
y
a
)2.
By Pinsker’s Inequality,
‖δy ∗ ρa − ρa‖ ≤
√
2D(δy ∗ ρa‖ρa) = |y|
a
·
Hence ‖δy ∗ ρa − ρa‖ ≤ min{2, |y|/a}. Because µ(R) = 1, [µ ∗ ρa](x)− ρa(x) =
∫
[δy ∗ ρa](x)− ρa(x) dµ(y),
and so
‖µ ∗ ρa − ρa‖ ≤
∫
R
‖δy ∗ ρa − ρa‖ d|µ|(y) ≤
∫
R
min{2, |y|/a} d|µ|(y),
which tends to 0 as a tends to infinity.
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We have shown that µ ∗ ν is a sum of positive measures, hence positive, and hence a
probability measure. It remains to be shown that ν has finite nth moment, and hence is in
Pn. To this end, note first that
pi =
√
2
c
|ρa ∗ (µ− δ)| ≤
√
2
c
(ρa ∗ (|µ|+ δ)) ∈Mn,
and so pi ∈ Pn. Since the nth moment of pi(k) is at most kn times the nth moment of pi, it
follows that τ ∈ Pn, and so ν = ρ(2)a ∗ τ ∈ Pn.
It is important that the proof of this lemma is constructive; indeed, we get that
ν = (1− c)ρ(2)a ∗
(
δ + cpi + c2pi(2) + · · · ),
for c that can be arbitrarily small, and a that may need to be correspondingly large. Since
ρa is the distribution of a Gaussian with zero mean and standard deviation a, ν is the
distribution of
Z = W + (X0 +X1 + · · ·+XN ),
where W is a Gaussian with mean zero and standard deviation
√
2a, X0 = 0, X1, X2, . . .
are i.i.d. random variables with distribution pi (defined in the proof), and N is geometric
with parameter c. In particular, when c is small, Z is close in total variation to W , as
‖ν − ρ(2)a ‖ ≤ c. This shows Remark 1, taking c = ε.
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 1. Let X and Y be two random variables
with k = E[X]− E[Y ] > 0. Define the signed measure σ as
σ(A) = 1
k
∫
A
FY (t)− FX(t) dt
for every A ⊆ R. By Tonelli’s Theorem
E[X] = E[X+]− E[X−] =
∫ ∞
0
1− FX(t)dt−
∫ 0
−∞
FX(t)dt
so
E[X]− E[Y ] = −
∫ 0
∞
(FX(t)− FY (t))dt+
∫ ∞
0
(FY (t)− FX(t))dt =
∫
R
FY (t)− FX(t) dt.
Hence σ(R) = 1. Furthermore, σ is a bounded measure, since
k|σ|(R) =
∫ ∞
−∞
|FY (t)− FX(t)|dt
≤
∫ 0
−∞
[
FY (t) + FX(t)
]
dt+
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− FY (t)) + (1− FX(t))
]
dt
= E[|X|] + E[|Y |].
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Also, if X,Y ∈ Pn then σ ∈ Mn−1, since, using integration by parts (i.e., Tonelli’s
Theorem),
k
∫ ∞
−∞
n|x|n−1 dσ(x) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
|x|n d(FY − FX)(x) = E[|X|n]− E[|Y |n] <∞.
Hence Lemma 1 implies that there exists a probability measure η ∈ Pn−1 such that
σ ∗ η ∈ Pn−1. Let Z be a random variable independent from X and Y with distribution η.
The measure σ is by definition absolutely continuous with density 1k (FY − FX). Therefore,
σ ∗ η is absolutely continuous as well, and its density s satisfies, almost everywhere,14
ks(x) =
∫
R
(FY (x− t)− FX(x− t)) dη(t)
= P[Y ≤ x− Z]− dP[X ≤ x− Z]
= FY+Z(x)− FX+Z(x).
Because σ ∗ η is a probability measure and d > 0, then FY+Z(x) ≥ FX+Z(x) for almost
every x. Since the cdfs are right-continuous, this implies FY+Z ≥ FX+Z . Furthermore,
this inequality is strict somewhere, since the integral of k(FY+Z − FX+Z) is equal to
one. Therefore, X + Z >1 Y + Z. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1; we have
furthermore demonstrated that when X,Y ∈ Pn then Z can be taken to be in Pn−1, for
any n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∞}.
We end this section by showing that the converse of Theorem 1 is also true: if
E[X] ≤ E[Y ] then there does not exist a random variable Z such that X + Z >1 Y + Z.
To see this, note that in this case the measure
σ′(A) =
∫
A
FY (t)− FX(t) dt
satisfies σ′(R) ≤ 0, and so for any probability measure η it holds that [σ′ ∗ η](R) ≤ 0. It
thus follows from the calculation above that FY+Z(x)− FX+Z(x) < 0 for some x (except
in the trivial case in which X and Y have the same distribution). Thus it is impossible
that X + Z >1 Y + Z.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let X and Y be random variables in Pn with E[X] = E[Y ] and k = 12(Var[Y ]−Var[X]) > 0.
Let FX and FY be the cumulative distribution functions of X and Y . Define the signed
measure σ as
σ(A) = 1
k
∫
A
∫ t
−∞
FY (u)− FX(u) dudt.
By using the assumptions that E[X] = E[Y ], E[X2],E[Y 2] <∞ and applying integration
by parts, it follows that
∫
R |
∫ t
−∞ FX(u) − FY (u) du |dt < ∞. See, for instance, (Rachev
14See Fremlin (2002, 257xe).
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et al., 2013, Lemma 15.2.1) or (Rachev and Stoyanov, 2008, p.160). Hence σ is bounded.
We show that a calculation similar to the one used in Theorem 1 shows that σ(R) = 1 and
that σ ∈Mn−2. More generally, we claim that for every k,∫ ∞
−∞
tkdσ(t) = 1(k + 1)(k + 2)
∫ ∞
−∞
uk+2 d(FY − FX)(u).
As is well known, integration by parts implies∫ t
−∞
FY (u) du = E[(t− Y )+] and
∫ t
−∞
FX(u) du = E[(t−X)+].
Hence, for every n and k,∫ n
−n
tk
∫ t
−∞
FY (u)− FX(u) dudt =
∫ n
−n
tk(E[(t− Y )+]− E[(t−X)+]) dt.
=
∫ n
−n
tk
∫ n
−∞
(t− u)+ d(FY − FX)(u) dt.
=
∫ n
−∞
∫ n
−n
tk(t− u)+ dtd(FY − FX)(u)
=
∫ n
−∞
∫ n
u
tk(t− u) dtd(FY − FX)(u)
=
∫ n
−∞
(
tk+2
k + 2 − u
tk+1
k + 1
) ∣∣∣n
u
d(FY − FX)(u)
=
∫ n
−∞
nk+2
k + 2 − u
nk+1
k + 1 +
uk+2
(k + 1)(k + 2) d(FY − FX)(u)
For every n, the last integral is well defined and finite provided X,Y ∈ Pk+2. It is a
standard result that everyW ∈ Pk+2 satisfies nk+2[1−FW (n)+FW (−n)]→ 0 as n→∞.15
Hence nk+2(FY −FX)(n)→ 0 as n→∞. To see that nk+1
∫ n
−∞ u d(FY −FX)(u) converges
to 0, notice that∫ n
−∞
nk+1ud(FY − FX)(u) ≤
∫ n
−n
nk+2 d(FY + FX)(u) +
∫ −n
−∞
|u|k+2 d(FY + FX)(u).
The first term on the right hand side converges to 0 by the same argument as above, and
the second term converges to 0 from the assumption that X,Y ∈ Pn+2. This concludes
the proof of the claim.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can invoke Lemma 1 to prove the existence of a
probability measure η ∈ Pn−1 such that σ ∗ η ∈ Pn−1. Let Z be a random variable
15This follows from
nk+2(P[|W |k+2 ≥ nk+2]) ≤ E[1{|W |k+2≥nk+2}|W |
k+2]
and the observation that since W k+2 is integrable, the right hand side must converge to 0 as n→∞.
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independent from X and Y with distribution η. Then s(x), the probability density function
of σ ∗ η, is
ks(x) =
∫
R
∫ x−t
−∞
FY (u)− FX(u) dudη(t)
=
∫
R
∫ x
−∞
FY (u− t)− FX(u− t) dudη(t)
=
∫ x
−∞
∫
R
FY (u− t)− FX(u− t) dη(t) du
=
∫ x
−∞
FY+Z(u)− FX+Z(u) du.
Since σ ∗ η is a probability measure then s(x) is non-negative for almost every x ∈ R.
Since FY+Z and FX+Z are right-continuous, this implies s ≥ 0. Furthermore, this inequality
is strict somewhere, since the integral of s is equal to one. Therefore, X + Z >2 Y + Z,
as
∫ x
−∞ FY+Z(u) − FX+Z(u) du ≥ 0 for all x is a well known condition for second-order
stochastic dominance (see Theorem 4.A.2 in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007).
C Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3 we first prove a version of Lemma 1 that gives a stronger results for
a smaller class of measures. Given M,L > 0, denote byMLM the set of bounded signed
measures µ that are supported in [−M,M ], and for which |µ|([a, b]) ≤ L(a − b) for all
a > b in [−M,M ].
Proposition 4. For every M,L > 0 there is a measure ν ∈ P∞ so that µ ∗ ν ∈ P∞ for
every µ ∈MLM with µ(R) = 1.
Given µ ∈M∞ and a > 0, define
µa = (µ− δ) ∗ ρa,
where, as in the proof of Lemma 1, δ is the point mass at 0, and ρa is the uniform
distribution on [−a, a]. Let ra = 12a1{[−a,a]} be the density of ρa. It follows that µa has a
density ma(x) =
∫
R ra(x− t)d(µ− δ)(t) given by
ma(x) =
1
2aµ([x− a, x+ a])− ra(x) (9)
and which satisfies the following properties:
Lemma 2. For any µ ∈MLM it holds that
1. |ma(x)| is at most ML/a+ 1/(2a).
2. ma(x) vanishes outside of the union of the intervals [−a −M,−a + M ] and [a −
M,a+M ].
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Proof. 1. Since µ ∈MLM , its norm ||µ|| is at most 2ML, and so |µ([x−a, x+a])| ≤ 2ML.
And since |ra| ≤ 1/(2a), it follows that |ma| ≤ML/a+ 1/(2a).
2. For x such that −a + M < x < a −M we have that µ([x − a, x + a]) = 1, since
[x− a, x+ a] includes [−M,M ] and thus all of the support of µ. Since ra(x) = 1/(2a)
in this range it follows that ma(x) = 0. For x < −a−M or x > a+M we have that
ra(x) = 0, and that likewise µ([x− a, x+ a]) = 0, since now [x+ a, x− a] does not
intersect [−M,M ]. Hence also in this range ma(x) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof will follow the proof of Lemma 1 and will refer to some
of the arguments given there. As in that proof, let ρa be the uniform distribution on
[−a, a]. Fix some 0 < c < 1 and pi ∈ P∞, and let
τ = (1− c)
∞∑
k=0
ckpi(k)
and
ν = ρ(2)a ∗ τ.
Choose any µ ∈MLM . Then as in the proof of Lemma 1 we have that
µ ∗ ν = ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ + cpi) ∗ τ + (1− c)ρ(2)a
and that
ρ(2)a ∗ (µ− δ + cpi) ≥
c
2ρa ∗
[2
c
ρa ∗ (µ− δ) + pi
]
= c2ρa ∗
[2
c
µa + pi
]
.
We now show how to choose a, c and pi so that 2cµa + pi is a positive measure, independent
of our choice of µ ∈ MLM . By part 1 of Lemma 2 we know that the density of 2c |µa| is
bounded from above by 2ML/(ac) + 1/(ac), and by part 2 of the same lemma we know
that it vanishes outside [−a −M,−a + M ] ∪ [a −M,a + M ]. Therefore, if we choose pi
to be the uniform distribution on this union of intervals then 2cµa + pi will be positive if
the density of pi on its support—which equals 1/(4M)—is larger than our bound on the
density of 2c |µa|. That is, we would like a and c to satisfy
1
4M ≥
2ML
ac
+ 1
ac
,
while keeping c < 1. Rearranging yields
ac ≥ 8M2L+ 4M,
which is satisfied if we take c = 1/2 and any a ≥ 16M2L+ 8M . The proof that ν ∈ P∞ is
identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 1.
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Given Proposition 4, the proof of Theorem 3 follows closely the proof of Theorem 1. If
X and Y are supported on [−M,M ] and if E[X]− E[Y ] ≥Mε then the measure σ, which
is given by
σ(A) = 1
E[X]− E[Y ]
∫
A
FY (t)− FX(t) dt,
is inM1/(εM)M . Proposition 4 shows we can find ν ∈ P∞ such that σ ∗ ν ∈ P∞. In addition,
as shown in the proof of the same proposition, given a ≥ 16Mε−1 + 8M , ν can be taken to
be the distribution of the random variable Z defined as (5) in the main text. Finally, the
same argument used in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that X + Z >1 Y + Z.
D Calculations For Section 2.2
Let X be a gamble paying g > 0 and −l < 0 with equal probability. Let Y = 0. Following
the proof Theorem 1, we first define µ to be the measure with support [−l, g] and density
1
E[X] (FY − FX)(s) =
−
1
g−l s ∈ [−l, 0]
1
g−l s ∈ [0, g]
and then seek to find a probability measure pi, and parameters a and c such that
(ρa ∗ µ− ρa) + c√2pi ≥ 0. (10)
Let φa and Φa be, respectively, the pdf and CDF of a Gaussian random variable with
mean zero and standard deviation a. Then ρa ∗ µ− ρa has density
t(s) = 1
g − l (2Φa(s)− Φa(s− g)− Φa(s+ l))− φa(s).
We claim that t(s) ≥ 0 for s > g and t(s) ≤ 0 for s < −l. By the mean-value theorem,
for each s there exist s1 ∈ [s− g, s] and s2 ∈ [s, s+ l] such that Φa(s)−Φa(s− g) = φa(s1)g
and Φa(s)− Φa(s+ l) = φa(s2)(−l). Hence
t(s) = 1
g − l (φa(s1)g − φa(s2)l)− φa(s). (11)
Suppose s− g > 0. Then φa(s1)g > φa(s)g. Hence (11) is greater than
1
g − l (φa(s)g − φa(s2)l)− φa(s) =
l
g − l (φa(s)− φa(s2)).
Since 0 < s < s2 then φa(s)− φa(s2) > 0. This shows that t(s) ≥ 0. Now suppose s < −l.
Then φa(s1)g < φa(s)g. Hence (11) is lower than
1
g − l (φa(s)g − φa(s2)l)− φa(s) =
l
g − l (φa(s)− φa(s2)),
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g l σW c σZ
12 10 3,500 0.014 3,525
12 10 4,000 0.011 4,025
100 50 4,500 0.022 4,551
100 50 10,000 0.010 10,050
100 70 11,000 0.018 11,102
Table 1: Properties of the noise Z = W + U1 + . . . + UN , where W is Gaussian with
mean zero and standard deviation σW , (Ui) are i.i.d. random variables, N is geometrically
distributed with parameter c, and σZ is the standard deviation of Z.
and because s < s2 < 0 then φa(s)− φa(s2) < 0. Therefore t(s) ≤ 0. This concludes the
proof of the claim. We take pi to be absolutely continuous with density f . Then (10) is
satisfied if
f(s) ≥ −
√
2
c
t(s).
We take f(s) = 0 if s > g (since then t(s) ≤ 0) and
f(s) =
√
2
c
|t(s)| if s ≤ g
and then set
c =
√
2
∫ g
−∞
|t(s)|ds
so that f integrates to 1.
Given the parameters g, l and a, the coefficient c and the pdf f can be computed
numerically. This allows us to describe some quantitative features of the background noise
Z, as discussed in section 2.2.
Table 1 provides some examples. For instance, when the binary gamble X pays $12 and
-$10 dollars with probability 1/2, there exists a background risk Z = W +U1 + . . .+UN such
that X +Z >1 Z and: the Gaussian W has standard deviation 3,500, P[N = n] = (0.014)n
for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and Z has standard deviation 3,525.
E A Lemma on Strict Bayesian Implementation
Lemma 3. Suppose that x ∈ Rn and vi(x, θ) = xiHi(θi) where Hi : Θi → R+ is strictly
increasing in θi and that types are independently drawn. Then for every Bayes IC mecha-
nism (x, t) and every  > 0 there exists another strictly Bayes IC mechanism (x, τ) that
implements the same physical allocation x and raises at most  less in expected revenue
E[τi(θ)] ≥ E[ti(θ)]− .
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Proof. Agent i’s interim utility when she is of type θi, but reports to be of type θ′i can be
written as
E[vi(x(θ′i, θ−i), (θi, θ−i))− ti(θ′i, θ−i)] = Qi(θ′i)Hi(θi)− Ti(θ′i)
where Qi(θ′i) = E[x(θ′i, θ−i)], Ti(θ′i) = E[ti(θ′i, θ−i)] . As the mechanism is Bayes incentive
compatible, i.e. satisfies (u-BIC) when u equals the identity, we have that for all θi, θ′i ∈ Θi
Qi(θi)Hi(θi)− Ti(θi) − Qi(θ′i)Hi(θi) + Ti(θ′i) ≥ 0 (12)
Qi(θ′i)Hi(θ′i)− Ti(θ′i) − Qi(θi)Hi(θ′i) + Ti(θi) ≥ 0 . (13)
Adding the two equations yield(
Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i)
)(
Hi(θi)−Hi(θ′i)
)
≥ 0 .
As Hi increases in θi it follows from the above equation that Qi is non-decreasing. Fur-
thermore, (12) and (13) imply that
(Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i))Hi(θ′i) ≤ Ti(θi)− Ti(θ′i) ≤ (Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i))Hi(θi) . (14)
We will next argue that the monotonicity of Qi in addition with (14) imposed for
adjacent types θ′i < θi are also sufficient for incentive compatibility.16 Consider an agent
who is of type θi, but who deviates to report that she is of type θ′i, which is not necessarily
adjacent. Her loss in interim expected utility from this deviation is given by
Qi(θi)Hi(θi)− Ti(θi)−Qi(θ′i)Hi(θi) + Ti(θ′i)
=
(
Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i)
)
Hi(θi)−
(
Ti(θi)− Ti(θ′i)
)
.
Suppose now that θ′i < θi and let (θk)k∈{0,...,m} be a sequence of adjacent types such that
θ′i = θ0 < θ1 < . . . < θm = θi. We have that the gain from deviating is given by(
Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i)
)
Hi(θi)−
(
Ti(θi)− Ti(θ′i)
)
=
m∑
k=1
(
Qi(θk)−Qi(θk−1)
)
Hi(θm)−
(
Ti(θk)− Ti(θk−1)
)
By the monotonicity of Qi and Hi we can bound the loss from below by
Qi(θi)Hi(θi)− Ti(θi)−Qi(θ′i)Hi(θi) + Ti(θ′i)
≥
m∑
k=1
(
Qi(θk)−Qi(θk−1)
)
Hi(θk)−
(
Ti(θk)− Ti(θk−1)
)
. (15)
As we imposed (14) for adjacent types we know that each component of the sum is non-
negative. Hence, the sum is non-negative and no downward deviation is profitable. The
16We say that two types θi, θ′i are adjacent if there exists no other type θ′′i such that θi < θ′′i < θ′i.
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case of upward deviations, i.e. θ′i > θi, is completely analogous. We thus have that the
mechanism (x, t) is Bayes incentive compatible if and only if Qi is non-decreasing for every
agent i and in addition for every two adjacent types θ′i < θi the following equation holds
(Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i))Hi(θ′i) ≤ Ti(θi)− Ti(θ′i) ≤ (Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i))Hi(θi) . (16)
Thus, an upper bound on the transfer is given by the transfer that solves the right inequality
with equality
Ti(θi)− Ti(θ′i) = (Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i))Hi(θi) .
Note, that for a sufficiently small  the transfer τi that for adjacent types θi > θ′i solves
τi(θi)− τi(θ′i) = (Qi(θi)−Qi(θ′i))Hi(θi)−

|Θi| .
and assigns the same transfer τi(θi) = Ti(θi) to the lowest type θi as the original transfer
Ti solves (16) with strict inequality. By (15) this implies that the mechanism is strictly
incentive compatible. The mechanism (x, τ) satisfies τi(θi) ≥ Ti(θi) −  and thus raises
at most  less revenue from each agent. Furthermore, each agent strictly prefers to be
truthful over deviating and reporting an adjacent type.
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